Abstract. In 1998, Boneh, Durfee and Frankel [4] presented several attacks on RSA when an adversary knows a fraction of the secret key bits. The motivation for these so-called partial key exposure attacks mainly arises from the study of side-channel attacks on RSA. With side channel attacks an adversary gets either most significant or least significant bits of the secret key. The polynomial time algorithms given in [4] only work provided that the public key e is smaller than N . Surprisingly, we get an even stronger result for known least significant bits: An algorithm that works for all e < N 7 8 . We also provide partial key exposure attacks on fast RSA-variants that use Chinese Remaindering in the decryption process (e.g. [20, 21] ). These fast variants are interesting for time-critical applications like smart-cards which in turn are highly vulnerable to side-channel attacks. The new attacks are provable. We show that for small public exponent RSA half of the bits of dp = d mod p − 1 suffice to find the factorization of N in polynomial time. This amount is only a quarter of the bits of N and therefore the method belongs to the strongest known partial key exposure attacks.
Introduction
Let (N, e) be an RSA public key with N = pq, where p and q are of equal bit-size. The secret key d satisfies ed = 1 mod φ(N ).
In 1998, Boneh, Durfee and Frankel [4] introduced the following question: How many bits of d does an adversary need to know in order to factor the modulus N ? In addition to its theoretical impact on understanding the complexity of the RSA-function, this is an important practical question arising from the intensive study of side-channel attacks on RSA in cryptography (e.g. fault attacks, timing attacks, power analysis, see for instance [6, 15, 16] ).
In many scenarios, an attacker using a side-channel attack either succeeds to obtain the most significant bits (MSBs) or the least significant bits (LSBs) of d in consecutive order. Whether he gets MSBs or LSBs depends on the different ways of computing an exponentiation with d during the decryption process. Therefore in this work, we just focus on the case where an adversary knows either MSBs or LSBs of d and we ignore attacks where an adversary has to know both sorts of bits or intermediate bits.
Cases have been reported in the literature [9] where side-channel attacks are able to reveal a fraction of the secret key bits, but fail to reveal the entire key. For instance it is often the case that an attacker gets the next bit of d under the conditional probability that his hypothesis of the previous bits is correct. Hence, it gets harder and harder for him to make a correct guess with a certain probability. This makes it essential to know how many bits of d suffice to discover the whole secret information.
Boneh, Durfee and Frankel [4] were the first that presented polynomial time algorithms when an attacker knows only a fraction of the bits. In the case of known least significant bits, they showed that for low public exponent RSA (e.g. e = poly(log N )) a quarter of the bits of d are sufficient to find the factorization of N . Their method makes use of a well-known theorem due to Coppersmith [8] : Given half of the bits of p, the factorization of N can be found in polynomial time.
Considering known MSBs, Boneh, Durfee and Frankel presented an algorithm that works for all e < N 1 2 , again using Coppersmith's theorem. However it remained an open question in [4] whether there are polynomial time algorithms that find the factorization of N for values of e substantially larger than N 1 2 given only a subset of the secret key bits.
In this work, we answer this question both in the case of known MSBs and of known LSBs.
MSBs of d known:
We present a method that works for all public exponents e in the interval [N The number of bits of d that have to be known increases with e. Let us provide some examples of the required bits: For e = N 0.5 one has to know half of the MSBs of d, for e = N 0.55 a 0.71-fraction suffices whereas for e = N 0.6 a fraction of 0.81 is needed to factor N . In contrast to Boneh, Durfee and Frankel we do not use Coppersmith's result for known bits of p. Instead we directly apply Coppersmith's method for finding roots of modular multivariate polynomial equations [8] . This method has many applications in cryptography. Since it is a heuristic in the multivariate case, our result is heuristic as well. However, in various other applications of Coppersmith's method (see [1, 3, 10, 14] ) a systematic failure of the multivariate heuristic has never been reported. Hence the heuristic is widely believed to work perfectly in practice. We also provide various experiments that confirm the reliability: None of our experiments failed to yield the factorization of N .
In Figure 1 we illustrate our result for MSBs. The size of the fraction of the bits that is needed in our attack is plotted as a function of the size of the public exponent e. We express the size of e in terms of the size of N (i.e. we use log N (e)). For a comparison with previous results, we also include in our graphs the results of Boneh, Durfee and Frankel. The marked regions in Figure 1 are the feasible regions for the various approaches.
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LSBs of d known:
We start by proving a result for all but a negligible fraction of the public exponents e < N 1 2 . Previously, only polynomial time algorithms for e of the order poly(log N ) were known [4] . Our approach uses a 3-dimensional lattice to find the factorization of N using a single lattice basis reduction, whereas the method in [4] requires about e lattice reductions. We tested our attack with the frequently used RSA-exponent e = 2 16 + 1. Our algorithm is faster than the method in [4] but requires more bits of d.
Interestingly, our approach makes use of the linear independence of two sufficiently short vectors in the lattice and we do not need to apply Coppersmith's heuristic in this case. This makes our method rigorous and at the same time introduces a new method to solve modular multivariate polynomial equations of a special form. Therefore we believe that our approach is of independent interest. Next, we generalize the 3-dimensional approach to multi-dimensional lattices. This improves the bound up to all e < N 7 8 , which is the largest bound for e in partial key exposure attacks that is known up to now. Unfortunately, since our attack relies on Coppersmith's method for modular multivariate polynomial equations, it becomes heuristic. But again in our experiments, we could not find a single failure of the multivariate heuristic. The results are illustrated in Figure 2 in the same fashion as before.
We raise the question whether it is possible to derive results for all keys e < φ(N ). In the light of our new results, this bound does not seem to be out of reach. Maybe a modification of our lattices could already suffice (e.g. using non-triangular lattice bases), but at the moment this is an open question.
Known bits in CRT-variants:
We present results on known bits of d p = d mod p − 1 (and symmetrically on d q = d mod q − 1). The value d p is used in fast Chinese Remainder variants of the decryption process. This includes the well-known Quisquater-Couvreur method [21] . With suitable modifications, the attack applies also to other fast RSA-variants like for instance Takagi's scheme [20] , which uses a modulus of the form p k q. These fast variants of RSA are especially interesting for time-critical applications. Therefore they are frequently used on smartcards. On the other hand, it is well-known that smart-cards are highly vulnerable to different sorts of side-channel attacks. Hence it is of important practical interest to study the complexity of partial key exposure attacks for CRT-variants.
We provide provable attacks for both cases: LSBs and MSBs. Interestingly, in our proofs we use a less known variant of a result of Coppersmith [8] that is due to HowgraveGraham. Coppersmith showed that an approximation of p up to an additive error of N 1 4 yields the factorization of N . Howgrave-Graham [13] observed that an approximation of kp for some (unknown) k with the same error bound already suffices.
We prove that for low public exponents e (i.e. e = poly(log N )), half of the LSBs of d p always suffice to factor N . Therefore the attack is a threat to RSAimplementations with the commonly used public exponent e = 2 16 + 1. Note that half of the bits of d p is only an amount of a quarter of the bits of N and therefore the result is as strong as the best known partial key exposure attacks.
In the case of known MSBs of d p , we present an algorithm that even works for all e < N 
Detailed overview:
We briefly overview all known polynomial time partial key exposure attack by giving the precise functions of the bits that have to be known. Let α = log N (e) denote the size of e in terms of N . In Figure 4 , the upper half of the table states the results for known MSBs whereas the lower half is dedicated to the results for known LSBs. The attacks for known bits of d p are stated in the last lines of each half.
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bits of dp The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present our methods for the CRT-variants. Here we use lattice reduction methods only as a black-box. In order to give the more elaborate results for partial key exposure attacks with large public exponent, we have to define some lattice notation in Section 3. The method for MSBs is presented in Section 4, the LSB-attacks are given in Section 5 and 6.
Known MSBs/LSBs and Chinese Remaindering
Throughout this work we will consider RSA-public keys (N, e) with N = pq, where p and q are of equal bit-size. Therefore p, q ≤ 2 √ N . Furthermore, we assume wlog that p ≤ q which implies p ≤ √ N and
The secret exponent d corresponding to (N, e) satisfies the equality ed = 1 mod φ(N ), where φ(N ) is the Euler totient function.
We will often talk of known most or least significant bits (MSBs/LSBs) of d, but we want to point out that this should only be understood as a helpful simplification to explain our results in the context of side-channel attacks. To be more precise, when we talk of k known LSBs of d, then in fact we only need to know integers
k is only the special case where we really know the bits. Analogously, in the case of known MSBs: We do not really need to know the MSBs but only an approximationd of d such that |d −d| can be suitably upper-bounded.
In order to speed up the decryption/signing process, it is common practice to use the values d p = d mod p − 1 and d q = d mod q − 1. To sign m, one computes m dp mod p and m dq mod q and combines the results using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT).
These fast RSA-variants are especially interesting for time-critical applications like smart-cards, which are highly vulnerable to side-channel attacks. However, it has never been studied how many bits of d p (or symmetrically of d q ) suffice in order to find the factorization of N . We present two provable results for RSA-variants with CRT in this section.
Both of our proofs use the following variation of a well-known theorem of Coppersmith [8] that is due to Howgrave-Graham. Coppersmith showed how to factor N given half of the MSBs of p. Howgrave-Graham [13] observed that this holds in more general form for the MSBs of multiples of p.
Theorem 1 (Howgrave-Graham) Let N = pq be an RSA-modulus and k be an unknown integer which is not a multiple of q. Given an approximation of kp with additive error at most N 1 4 , the factorization of N can be found in polynomial time.
First, we consider the case of known LBSs of d p . We show that whenever the public exponent e is of size poly(log N ), then half of the lower bits of d p are sufficient to find the factorization of N in polynomial time.
Theorem 2 Let (N, e) be an RSA public key with N = pq and secret key d. Let
Then the factorization of N can be found in time e · poly(log N ).
Proof: We know that
for some k ∈ AE. Since d p < p − 1, we know that k = edp−1 p−1 < e. Let us write
. We can rewrite our equation as
Let E be the inverse of eM modulo N , e.g. there exist a c ∈ AE such that E ·eM =
Then N can be factored in polynomial time.
Proof: We start again by looking at the equation ed p − 1 = k(p − 1). Since d p < p−1, we know that k < N α , which implies that q cannot divide k. Computẽ p = ed − 1. Now,p is an approximation of kp up to an additive error of at most 
Preliminaries on Lattices
Since our partial key exposure attacks for large public exponents use polynomial arithmetic, we introduce some helpful notations. Let f (x, y) = i,j a i,j x i y j be a bivariate polynomial with coefficients a i,j ∈ . All terms x i y j with non-zero coefficients are called monomials. The coefficient vector of f is defined by the vector of the coefficients a i,j . We define the norm of f as the Euclidean norm of the coefficient vector: ||f || 2 = i,j a 2 i,j . The definitions for trivariate polynomials are analogous. In the following, we state a few basic facts about lattices and lattice basis reduction and refer to the textbooks [7, 11, 18] for an introduction to the theory of lattices.
Let v 1 , . . . , v n ∈ Ê n be linearly independent vectors. A lattice L spanned by {v 1 , . . . , v n } is the set of all integer linear combinations of v 1 , . . . , v n . We call n the dimension of L, which we denote by dim(L).
The set B = {v 1 , . . . , v n } is called a basis of L, the (n×n)-matrix consisting of the row vectors v 1 , . . . , v n is called basis matrix. A basis of L can be transformed into another basis by applying an unimodular transformation to the basis matrix. The determinant det(L) is the absolute value of the determinant of a basis matrix.
The famous L 3 -lattice reduction algorithm of Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász [17] can be used to approximate a shortest vector.
Theorem 4 (Lenstra, Lenstra, Lovász) Let L ∈ n be a lattice spanned by {v 1 , . . . , v n }. The L 3 -algorithm outputs in polynomial time a reduced lattice basis {v
This theorem can easily be proven using [7] , Theorem 2.6.2.
In Sections 4 and 6, we will use a heuristic of Coppersmith [8] for multivariate modular polynomial equations. This heuristic has proven to be very useful in many attacks (see [1, 3, 10, 14] ). We made various experiments for our approaches and the methods never failed to reveal the desired factorization of N . Therefore, we make the following assumption which refers to the only heuristic part in our computations of Section 4 and 6. Then N can be factored in time polynomial in log N .
Before we start to prove Theorem 6, in Figure 5 we provide some experimental results to give an idea of the amount of bits that is needed in our partial key exposure attack. The experiments also confirm the reliability of the multivariate heuristic and support our Assumption 5.
Then a fraction of 1 − δ of the MSBs of d is required (asymptotically) for the new attack. For α = 0.55 this is a 0.710-fraction and for α = 0.6 we require a 0.809-fraction. Note that these theoretical bounds hold as N and the lattice dimension go to infinity. All of our experiments were carried out on a 500-MHz workstation using Shoup's NTL [19] . Proof (Theorem 6). : We start by looking at the public key equation
Boneh, Durfee and Frankel [4] observed that a suitable fraction of the MSBs of d yields the parameter k. The main drawback of the methods presented in [4] is that they all require that k is known exactly. This restricts the methods' usability to public exponents e ≤ √ N . Now let us relax this restriction and look at the case where one obtains only an approximationk of k. Letk = ed−1 N +1 , then
We claim that the hard case is the one where the term N . In this case, |k −k| can be bounded by N α+δ−1 , where we neglect low order terms. Hence whenever α + δ − 1 ≤ 0, then k can be determined exactly. Note that the condition in Theorem 6 implies the desired inequality δ ≤ 1 − α.
But if k is known, we can compute p + q = N + 1 − k −1 mod e. On the other hand e ≥ N 1 2 and therefore we get p + q over the integers and not modulo e. This leads to the factorization of N .
Hence, we assume in the following that N (1) as
This can also be written as
Equation ( . Then, we have x 0 ≤ X, y 0 ≤ Y and z 0 ≤ Z. Now we use Coppersmith's method [8] in order to construct from f N (x, y, z) a polynomial f (x, y, z) with the same root (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) over (and not just modulo N ). The following theorem due to Howgrave-Graham [12] is a convenient reformulation of Coppersmith's method.
Theorem 7 (Howgrave-Graham) Let f (x, y, z) be a polynomial that is a sum of at most ω monomials. Suppose that
Then f (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) = 0 holds over the integers.
Next, we construct polynomials that all satisfy condition (1) of HowgraveGraham's Theorem. Thus, every integer linear combination of these polynomials also satisfies the first condition. We search among these linear combinations for a polynomial f that satisfies condition (2). This will be done using the L 3 -lattice reduction algorithm.
Let us start by defining the following polynomials g i,j (x, y, z) and h i,j (x, y, z) for some fixed integers m and t: . Applying Theorem 4, we know that for an L 3 -reduced basis {v
Since we need ||v
, we have to satisfy the condition
where c = 2
does not depend on N and therefore contributes to the error term ǫ.
Most of the following computations are straightforward but tedious. So we only sketch the rest of the proof.
.
Using the bounds
2 )(1+o (1)) .
An easy calculation shows that n = (1)). Neglecting low order terms, our condition simplifies to
The left hand side is minimized for the choice τ = 2 3
1−δ−α 2α−1 . Plugging this value in, we obtain the desired condition
which concludes the proof.
Combining Theorem 7 and Lemma 8, from the three vectors with norm smaller than
we obtain three polynomials f 1 (x, y, z), f 2 (x, y, z) and f 3 (x, y, z)
with the common root (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ). Our goal is to extract the value z 0 = p + q − 1. The equation N = pq together with the number z 0 yields the factorization of N . Therefore, we take the resultants res x (f 1 , f 2 ) and res x (f 1 , f 3 ) with respect to x. The resulting polynomials g 1 and g 2 are bivariate polynomials in y and z. In order to remove the unknown y, we compute the resultant res y (g 1 , g 2 ) which is an univariate polynomial in z. The root z 0 most be among the roots of this polynomial. Thus, if res y (g 1 , g 2 ) is not the zero polynomial (Assumption 5) then z 0 can be found by standard root finding algorithms. This concludes the proof of Theorem 6.
5 LSBs known: A provable method for e < N 1 2
In this section, we present a provable attack on RSA with public key e < N k . In the following we show that whenever M is sufficiently large then N can be factored in polynomial time for all but a negligible fraction of choices for e.
Theorem 9
Let N be an RSA-modulus and let 0 < α, ǫ < Then the factorization of N can be found in polynomial time.
Before we prove the theorem, we want to give some experimental results. We tested our algorithm with the commonly used public exponent e = 2 16 + 1 and varying 1000-bit moduli N , where we knew 525 LSBs of d. Note that in comparison to the Boneh-Durfee-Frankel-approach for LSBs, we need about twice as many bits but in their method one has to run a lattice reduction about e times. The running time of our algorithm is about 1 second on a 500 MHz workstation. In 100 experiments, the algorithm never failed to yield the factorization of N . 
Equation (3) in turn gives us a bivariate polynomial
In order to bound y 0 notice that
Since d As in Section 4, we want to transform our polynomial f N (x, y) into a polynomial f (x, y) with the root (x 0 , y 0 ) over the integers. Therefore, we apply Howgrave-Graham's Theorem (Theorem 7) in the bivariate case. For this purpose we take the auxiliary polynomials N and N x which are both the zero polynomial modulo N . Thus, every integer linear combination f = a 0 N + a 1 N x+ a 2 f N (x, y) has the root (x 0 , y 0 ) modulo N .
According to the second condition of Howgrave-Graham's Theorem we have to look for an integer linear combination f satisfying ||f (xX, yY )|| ≤ N √ 3
. Thus, we search for a suitably small vector in the lattice L given by the span of the row vectors of the following (3 × 3)-lattice base . Since L has dimension 3, we can compute two shortest linearly independent vectors in L in polynomial time using an algorithm of Blömer [2] . In practice, the L 3 -algorithm will suffice. Assume we can find two linearly independent vectors with norm smaller than
. Then we obtain from Theorem 7 the following two equations a 0 N + a 1 N x 0 + a 2 f N (x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 and
From equation (3) we know that f (x 0 , y 0 ) = kN . Hence, our equations simplify to the linear system
are linearly independent and satisfy (4), then the 2-dimensional vectors (a 1 , a 2 ), (b 1 , b 2 ) are also linearly independent. But this implies that we can determine x 0 , k as the unique solution of the linear system. Afterwards, we can derive y 0 by y 0 = kN −eM x 0 −ed 0 . Therefore, . The following lemma proves that this is satisfied for most choices of e using a counting argument. .
Proof: In terms of lattice theory, we have to show that for most of the choices of e the second successive minima λ 2 of L is strictly less than
. By Minkowski's second theorem we know that for any 3-dimensional lattice L and its successive minima
In our case det(L) = N 2 XY . Hence for all e such that λ 1 > 6XY , we get
and we are done. Now assume λ 1 ≤ 6XY . Hence, we can find coefficients c 0 , c 1 , c 2 ∈ such that (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 )B < 6XY . This implies
Using XY ≤ 3N 1−ǫ , the second inequality implies
Next we bound the number of e's in [3, N α ] that can satisfy (5) for some ratio public keys e such that (5) is satisfied.
-Since e ≤ N α and M ≤ 2N -The previous observation and c 2 ≤ 6X imply, that the number of public keys e for which (5) is satisfied for some ratio c1 c2 is bounded by 432N α−ǫ .
The last observation concludes the proof of Lemma 10.
6 LSBs known: A method for all e with e < N 7 8 In this section, we improve the approach of Section 5 by taking multi-dimensional lattices. In contrast to Section 5 our results are not rigorous. As in Section 4 they rely on Coppersmith's heuristic for multivariate modular equations. However, the results are even stronger: We obtain an attack for all e < N 7 8 .
Theorem 11 Under Assumption 5, for every ǫ > 0 there exists N 0 such that for every N ≥ N 0 the following holds: Let (N, e) be an RSA public key with α = log N (e) ≤ Then N can be factored in polynomial time.
Before we start with the proof of Theorem 11, in Figure 6 we provide some experimental results to give an idea of the number of bits that are needed in our partial key exposure attack. We fixed a bit-size of 1000 for the modulus N and used varying sizes of 300, 400 and 500 bits for e. Theorem 11 states that we need to know at least 725, 782 and 834 LSBs of d, respectively. In order to fulfill the second condition in Howgrave-Graham's theorem, we have to find vectors in L(m) with norm less than
. The following lemma states that one can always find two such sufficiently short vectors in L(m) using the L 3 -algorithm.
Lemma 12 Let e, M be as defined in Theorem 11. Suppose Y = N α and Z = 3N Neglecting all terms that do not depend on N , the condition simplifies to det L(M ) < (eM ) m(n−1) . We set t = τ m. Then, a straightforward calculation shows that det L(M ) = (eM X) 3τ +2 Z 3τ 2 +3τ +1 On the other hand, we know that eM ≥ N Combining Theorem 7 and Lemma 12, we obtain two polynomials f 1 (y, z), f 2 (y, z) with the common root (y 0 , z 0 ) over the integers. By Assumption 5, the resultant res y (f 1 , f 2 ) is non-zero such that we can find z 0 = p + q − 1 using standard root finding algorithms. This gives us the factorization of N .
